Directors’ Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy

This section describes the Directors’ Remuneration Policy (the Policy) for which shareholder approval will be sought at the AGM on 9 May 2024 and which, if approved will formally come into effect from that date. It is intended that this Policy will last for three years from the 2024 AGM date.

The Committee is comfortable the Policy approved at the 2021 AGM coped well with the challenges presented by the last three years and remains fit for purpose. As a result, the new Policy retains the current Policy structure which includes an annual bonus (Bonus) and PSP opportunity based on a percentage of annual salary.

The limited changes proposed provide additional flexibility for succession and strategic priorities, with the key changes summarised below. Certain minor technical changes have also been made to reflect evolving market practice.

Policy overview

This Policy has been prepared in accordance with the Large and Medium-sized Companies and Groups (Accounts and Reports) Regulations 2008, as subsequently amended. The Remuneration Policy has been developed taking into account a number of regulatory and governance principles, including:

- The 2018 UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code)
- The regulatory framework applying to the Financial Services Sector (including the Dual-regulated firms Remuneration Code and provisions of the EU Capital Requirements Directive)
- The Executive remuneration guidelines of the main institutional investors and their representative bodies

Approach to designing the Policy

The Committee is responsible for the development, implementation and review of the Policy. In addressing this responsibility, the Committee works with management and external advisers to develop proposals and recommendations. The Committee considers the source of information presented to it, takes care to understand the detail and ensures that independent judgement is exercised when making decisions. The Group Risk Committee considers whether the Policy and practices are in line with the Group’s risk appetite and the Group Audit Committee confirms incentive plan performance results, where appropriate.

The Code sets out principles against which the Committee should determine the Policy for Executive Directors. These are shown in the first column of the table on page 171 together with the Committee’s approach, in the second column.

Change	Rationale
Bonus and PSP – individual opportunity limits	The Committee proposes to increase the individual Bonus and PSP limits to 135% of annual salary to provide additional flexibility in the design of the remuneration package for newly appointed Executive Directors (with the possibility that the reshaped package offers lower fixed and higher variable pay).The current Executive Directors will continue to be eligible for a Bonus and PSP award based on 110% of annual salary. Overall packages will be appropriately positioned versus peers and challenging performance targets will be set to ensure higher payouts reflect superior performance
Bonus – individual performance percentage	The Committee proposes additional flexibility to base up to 20% of the Bonus on personal/strategic performance, rather than the 10% fixed percentage in the current Policy. An appropriate percentage of between zero and 20% will be agreed for each individual. The Committee will not use 20% as a matter of default, but will use the range judiciously. The Scorecard will continue to drive at least 80% of an individual’s Bonus outcome, with the majority of the Scorecard outcome based on financial metrics. Higher individual performance percentages will be used where it is important to drive strategic initiatives such as digitalisation, the capital plan and regulatory priorities. The percentages will be tailored for each executive and receive detailed scrutiny

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

Principle	Committee approach
Clarity – remuneration arrangements should be transparent and promote effective engagement with shareholders and the workforce	• We aim to set out our approach to remuneration in this report as transparently as possible • We engage with our top shareholders and shareholders' proxy agencies when making changes to the Policy and their views are taken into account • We engage with Our Voice annually to explain the alignment of the Policy with that of the workforce; and to encourage workforce feedback on the Policy
Simplicity – remuneration structures should avoid complexity and their rationale and operation should be easy to understand	• Within the required regulatory framework and in line with investor guidance, we have structured the Policy to be as simple as possible • We have a simple policy offering a pension at the same rate as employees, an annual bonus plan which cascades to most employees and, for senior employees, performance shares to provide alignment with longer-term performance and stakeholder experience • There is, however, a degree of complexity required for Executive Director packages to ensure a robust link to performance, to avoid reward for failure and to comply with investor and Code requirements
Risk – remuneration arrangements should ensure reputational and other risks arising from excessive rewards and behavioural risks that can arise from target-based incentive plans are identified and mitigated	• We have mitigated these risks through careful policy design, including long-term performance measurement, the use of specific risk-based measures, deferral and shareholding requirements (including post-cessation of employment) and discretion and clawback provisions if incentive payment levels are inappropriate
Predictability – the range of possible values of rewards to individual Directors and any other limits or discretions should be identified and explained at the time of approving the Remuneration Policy	• We look carefully each year at the range of likely performance outcomes for incentive plans when setting performance target ranges for threshold, target and maximum payouts and would use discretion where this leads to an inappropriate pay outcome
Proportionality – the link between individual awards, the delivery of strategy and the long-term performance of the Company should be clear. Outcomes should not reward poor performance	• Incentive plans are determined based on a proportion of base salary, with a balance between fixed pay and performance-linked elements • There are provisions to override the formula-driven outcome to ensure that poor performance is not rewarded or if incentive payments are too high for the performance delivered, in the view of the Committee • As illustrated by the chart showing our TSR performance and historical CEO remuneration on page 161, we believe there has been a strong link between Executive Directors' pay and performance
Alignment to culture – incentive schemes should drive behaviours consistent with Company purpose, values and strategy	• The Scorecard used for the Bonus will be based on a wide range of measures linked to financial, customer and quality performance, to ensure that payments are aligned to Company culture and values • Bonus plans designed for sales teams operate widely throughout the Company and are approved by the Committee to ensure consistency with Company purpose, values and strategy

How the views of employees and shareholders are taken into account

The Committee Chair is the designated NED in relation to employee matters; she regularly meets with employees, including through Our Voice. The Committee Chair attends Our Voice annually to provide an overview of Executive Directors' pay and governance within the Group and to provide the opportunity for employees to give feedback on the Policy, with this feedback communicated to the Committee and the Board. The Committee also receives updates on the remuneration structure throughout the Group, with salary and bonus reviews each year. As set out in the Policy table above, in setting remuneration for the Executive Directors, the Committee takes note of the overall approach to rewards for employees in the Group and salary increases will ordinarily be in line with or lower than those of the wider workforce (in percentage of salary terms). Thus, the Committee is satisfied that the decisions made in relation to Executive Directors' pay are made with an appropriate understanding of the outcomes for the wider workforce.

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

The Committee undertook extensive engagement with shareholders during the review of the Policy in late 2023 and early 2024 to understand the views of shareholders. The top 20 shareholders, representing over half or the shareholder register, were contacted in November 2023. Three shareholder representative bodies and proxy advisory firms were also contacted. The Committee believes the consultation confirms that shareholders and the main shareholder representative bodies and proxy advisory firms are supportive of the Committees proposals, although the Committee notes they will carefully scrutinise the use of the higher variable pay incentives in the context of the overall package for new Executive Directors, the personal objectives used to support higher individual bonus percentages should be robust and appropriate disclosures are required to support the rationale for remuneration decisions.

The Committee will seek to engage with major shareholders and the main shareholder representative bodies and proxy advisory firms when it is proposed that any material changes are to be made to the Policy or its implementation. In addition, we will consider any shareholder feedback received on the Policy at each AGM.

The table below and the accompanying notes describe the Policy for Executive Directors.

Element	Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and performance conditions	Maximum
Salary	To reward Executive Directors for their role and duties required Recognises an individual's experience, responsibility and performance	Paid monthly Base salaries are usually reviewed annually, with any changes usually effective from 1 April No performance conditions apply to the payment of salary. However, when setting salaries, account is taken of an individual's specific role, duties, experience and contribution to the Company As part of the salary review process, the Committee takes account of individual and corporate performance, increases provided to the wider workforce and the external market for UK listed companies both in the financial services sector and across all sectors	Increases will generally be broadly in line with or below the average of the UK workforce (as a percentage of salary). Higher increases may be awarded in exceptional circumstances such as a material increase in the scope of the role, following the appointment of a new Executive Director (which could also include internal promotions), to bring an initially below-market package in line with the market over time or in response to market factors
Benefits	To provide market competitive benefits to ensure the well-being of employees	The Company currently provides: • car allowance • life assurance • income protection • private medical insurance • other benefits as appropriate for the role	There is no maximum cap on benefits, as the cost of benefits may vary according to the external market
Pension	To provide a contribution to retirement planning	Executive Directors may participate in a defined contribution plan or, if they are in excess of the HMRC annual or lifetime allowances for contributions, may elect to receive cash in lieu of all or some of such benefit	In line with the rate received by the majority of the workforce, which is currently 8% of salary

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

Element	Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and performance conditions	Maximum
Bonus	To incentivise and reward individuals for the achievement of pre-defined, Committee-approved, annual financial, operational and individual objectives which are closely linked to the corporate strategy	Between 80-100% of the Bonus outcome is based on performance measured in line with an agreed Scorecard, with at least 50% of the bonus based on financial performance. The remaining 0-20% of the Bonus outcome is based on personal/strategic performance targets The objectives in the Scorecard, and the weightings on each element, will be set annually and may be flexed according to individual roles. Each element will be assessed independently, but with Committee discretion to vary the payout (including to zero) to ensure there is a strong link between payout and performance The Bonus outcome also has a risk underpin if the Committee believes an adjustment of the outcome is appropriate. There is also a general discretion to adjust the outcome to reflect other exceptional factors at the discretion of the Committee Normally at least 50% of any bonus earned will be delivered in shares, subject to a three year holding period In circumstances of a high Bonus payout there may be a regulatory requirement to defer a proportion of the Bonus payout, with vesting staggered over three to seven years, in line with the deferral arrangements for the PSP described below Malus and clawback provisions apply, as described in note 1 on page 173	The maximum Bonus opportunity for incumbent Executive Directors in any financial year will remain at 110% of salary Under the new Policy, the maximum bonus opportunity for new Executive Directors (i.e. not Andy Golding or April Talintyre) may be up to 135% of salary The threshold level for payment is 25% of maximum for any quantitative measure
Performance Share Plan	To incentivise and recognise execution of the business strategy over the longer-term Rewards strong financial, share, risk and ESG performance over a sustained period	PSP awards will typically be made annually at the discretion of the Committee, usually following the announcement of full-year results Usually, awards will be based on a mixture of internal financial performance targets, risk-based measures, ESG measures and relative TSR. At least 50% of the total PSP award will ordinarily be based on financial and relative TSR metrics The performance targets will usually be measured over three years Any vesting will be subject to an underpin, whereby the Committee must be satisfied that: (i) the vesting reflects the underlying performance of the Company (ii) the business has operated within the Board's risk appetite framework (iii) individual conduct has been satisfactory There is also a general discretion to adjust the outcome to reflect other exceptional factors at the discretion of the Committee Awards vest in line with regulatory requirements. Awards granted since 1 January 2020 vest in five equal tranches of 20%, following the Committee's determination of the extent to which performance conditions have been met. At the time each tranche vests, a one year holding period will apply Malus and clawback provisions apply as described in note 1 on page 173	The maximum PSP opportunity for incumbent Executive Directors will remain at 110% of salary in respect of grants in any financial year Under the new Policy, the maximum PSP opportunity for new Executive Directors (i.e. not Andy Golding or April Talintyre) may be up to 135% of salary in respect of grants in any financial year The threshold level for payment is 25% of maximum for any quantitative measure Where relevant regulations do not permit dividend equivalent payments until after vesting, the number of shares granted may be uplifted to reflect the absence of dividends or dividend equivalents during the vesting period (e.g. to broadly reflect the expected dividend yield on the shares)

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

Element	Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and performance conditions	Maximum
All-employee share plan (e.g. Sharesave Plan)	All employees, including Executive Directors, are encouraged to become shareholders through an all-employee share plan	A tax-favoured plan under which regular monthly savings may be made over a three year period. These savings can then be used to fund the exercise of an option at the end of the three year period, where the exercise price is discounted by up to 20% Executive Directors may also participate in other all-employee HMRC approved share plans should they be introduced by OSB Group in the future	Maximum permitted savings based on HMRC limits
Share ownership guidelines	To increase alignment between Executive Directors and shareholders	Executive Directors are expected to build and maintain a minimum holding of OSB Group shares Executive Directors must retain at least 50% of the shares acquired on vesting of any share awards (net of tax) until the required holding is attained On cessation of employment, Executive Directors must retain the lower of the in-service shareholding requirement, or the Executive Directors' actual shareholding, for two years	At least 250% of salary for the CEO and at least 200% of salary for the CFO, or such higher level as the Committee may determine from time to time The net of tax value of any unvested deferred awards (which are not subject to any future performance condition) may count towards the definition of a shareholding for this purpose

1. Malus and clawback provisions apply to both the annual bonus, including amounts deferred into shares, and PSP awards. These provide for the recovery of incentive payments within seven years in the event of: (i) a material misstatement of results; (ii) an error; (iii) a significant failure of risk management; (iv) regulatory censure; (v) in instances of individual gross misconduct; (vi) corporate failure; (vii) reputational damage; or (viii) any other exceptional circumstance as determined by the Board. A further three years may be applied following such a discovery in order to allow for the investigation of any such event. In order to affect any such clawback, the Committee may use a variety of methods: withhold deferred bonus shares, future PSP awards or cash bonuses, or seek to recoup cash or shares already paid.

Choice of performance measures for Executive Directors' awards

The Group uses a Scorecard to support its annual Bonus which incorporates both financial and non-financial business drivers across the Group. The combination of performance measures ties the Bonus outcome to the balanced delivery of corporate targets, risk measures and personal/strategic objectives. The Committee sets the threshold, target and stretch limits and reviews the measures used in the Scorecard annually, to ensure they continue to be relevant and remain anchored to the corporate plan.

The PSP incorporates measures of shareholder, financial and non-financial performance, in line with our key objectives of sustained growth in earnings leading to the creation of shareholder value over the long-term with appropriate consideration of risk and ESG performance. Relative TSR provides close alignment between the relative returns experienced by our shareholders and the rewards to Executive Directors.

There is an underpin for the PSP to ensure payouts are aligned with underlying performance, financial and non-financial risk and individual conduct.

Bonus and PSP targets are set taking into account the business plan, shareholders' expectations, the external market and regulatory requirements.

In line with HMRC regulations for such schemes, the Sharesave Plan does not operate performance conditions.

How the Group Remuneration and People Committee operates the variable pay policy

The Committee operates the share plans in accordance with their respective rules, the Listing Rules and HMRC requirements, where relevant. The Committee, consistent with market practice, retains discretion over a number of areas relating to the operation and administration of certain plans, including:

- Who participates in the plans
- The form of the award (for example, conditional share award or nil cost option)
- When to make awards and payments; how to determine the size of an award; a payment; and when and how much of an award should vest
- Whether share awards will be eligible to receive dividend equivalents and the method of calculation. Where relevant regulations do not permit dividend equivalents until after vesting, the number of shares granted may be uplifted to reflect the absence of dividends or dividend equivalents during the vesting period (e.g. to broadly reflect the expected dividend yield on the shares)

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

- The testing of a performance condition over a shortened performance period
- How to deal with a change of control or restructuring of the Group
- Whether a participant is a 'good' or 'bad' leaver for incentive plan purposes; what proportion of an award vests at the original vesting date, or whether and what proportion of an award may vest at the time of leaving
- How and whether an award may be adjusted in certain circumstances (e.g. for a rights issue, a corporate restructuring or for special dividends)
- What the weighting, measures and targets should be for the Bonus and PSP each year

The Committee also retains the discretion to adjust existing targets and/or set different measures for the Bonus. For the PSP, if events happen that cause the Committee to determine the targets are no longer appropriate, an amendment could be made so the PSP can achieve its original purpose, with the new targets not materially less or more difficult to satisfy.

Any use of the above discretions would, where relevant, be explained in the Annual Report and may, as appropriate, be the subject of consultation with the Company's major shareholders.

The Group operates in a heavily regulated sector, the rules of which are subject to frequent amendment. The Committee therefore retains the discretion to make adjustments to payments under this Policy as required by financial services regulations.

Conflicts of interest

The Committee ensures that no Executive Director is present when their remuneration is being discussed and considers any potential conflicts prior to meeting materials being distributed and at the beginning of each meeting.

Awards granted prior to the effective date

Any commitments entered into with Executive Directors prior to the effective date of this Policy will be honoured. Details of any such payments will be set out in the Annual Report as they arise.

Remuneration Policy for other employees

The Committee has regard to pay structures across the Group when setting the Policy for Executive Directors and ensures that policies at and below the Executive Director level are coherent. There are no significant differences in the overall remuneration philosophy, although pay is generally more variable and linked more to the long-term for those at more senior levels. The Committee's primary reference point for the salary reviews for the Executive Directors is the average salary increase for the UK workforce, with the expectation that increases for Executive Directors will, other than in exceptional circumstances, be at or below the increase for the UK workforce (as a percentage of salary).

A Scorecard is used to assess Bonus outcomes throughout the Group, with measures weighted according to role, where relevant.

Overall, the Policy for the Executive Directors is more heavily weighted towards performance-related pay than for other employees. In particular, performance-related long-term incentives are not provided outside the most senior management population as they are reserved for those considered to have the greatest potential to influence overall performance.

Although PSPs are awarded only to the most senior managers in the Group, the Group is committed to widespread equity ownership and a Sharesave Plan is available to all employees in the UK. Executive Directors are eligible to participate in this plan on the same basis as other employees.

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

Illustration of application of Remuneration Policy

The chart below illustrates how the composition of the Executive Directors' remuneration packages would vary under various performance scenarios, based on the intended implementation in 2024.



1. Minimum performance assumes no award is earned under the Bonus and no vesting is achieved under the PSP – only fixed pay (salary, benefits and pension are payable).
2. At on-target, half of the Bonus is earned (i.e. 55% of salary) and 25% of maximum is achieved under the PSP (i.e. 27.5% of salary).
3. At maximum, full vesting is achieved under both the Bonus and PSP (i.e. 110% of salary under the Bonus and PSP for current Executive Directors).
4. At maximum, but illustrating the effect of a 50% increase in the share price on PSP awards.

Other than as noted in the chart above, share price growth and all-employee share plan participation are not considered in these scenarios.

The terms and provisions that relate to remuneration in the Executive Directors' service agreements are set out below. Service contracts are available for inspection at the Company's registered office.

Provision	Policy
Notice period	12 months on either side
Termination payments	A payment in lieu of notice may be made on termination to the value of the Executive Director's basic salary at the time of termination. Such payments may be made in instalments and in such circumstances can be reduced to the extent that the Executive Director mitigates their loss. Rights to Deferred Share Bonus Plan and PSP awards on termination are shown below. The employment of each Executive Director is terminable with immediate effect without notice in certain circumstances, including gross misconduct, fraud or financial dishonesty, bankruptcy or material breach of obligations under their service agreements
Remuneration	Salary, pension and core benefits are specified in the agreements. There is no contractual right to participate in the Bonus or to receive long-term incentive awards
Post-termination	These include six months' post-termination restrictive covenants against competing with the Group; nine months' restrictive covenants against dealing with clients or suppliers of the Group; and nine months' restrictive covenants against soliciting clients, suppliers and key employees
Contract date	Andy Golding, 12 February 2020; April Talintyre, 12 February 2020
Unexpired term	Rolling contracts

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

Payments for loss of office

On termination, other than for gross misconduct, the Executive Directors are contractually entitled to salary, pension and contractual benefits (car allowance, private medical cover, life assurance and income protection) over their notice period. The Group may make a payment in lieu of notice equivalent to the salary for the remaining notice period. Payments in lieu of notice would normally be phased and subject to mitigation, by offsetting the payments against earnings elsewhere.

The Group may also pay reasonable legal costs in respect of any compromise settlement.

Annual bonus on termination

There is no automatic/contractual right to bonus payments and the default position is that the individual will not receive a payment. The Committee may determine that an individual is a 'good leaver' and may elect to pay a pro-rated bonus for the period of employment at its discretion and based on full-year performance.

Deferred share bonus awards on termination

Shares which are subject to a holding period will ordinarily be released at the normal time. Where a portion of the Bonus is deferred, subject to vesting conditions, beyond termination (e.g. to comply with FCA regulations), awards will be treated in line with the relevant plan rules and vest at the normal time.

Performance Share Plan awards on termination

Awards normally lapse on termination of employment. However, in certain 'good leaver' situations, awards may vest on the normal vesting date to the extent that the performance conditions are met. The Committee is, however, permitted under the PSP rules and FCA regulations to allow early vesting of the award to the extent it considers appropriate, taking into account performance to date. Unless the Committee determines otherwise, awards vesting in 'good leaver' situations will be pro-rated for the time employed during the performance period. Shares which are subject to a post-vesting holding period will ordinarily be released at the normal time.

The Committee will normally apply its discretion to allow PSP awards to vest at the normal time if an employee leaves for reason of resignation after the performance period has ended and performance has been tested, subject to the individual not joining a competing firm in a relevant role. Awards will lapse in full for participants that leave for reason of resignation before the performance has been tested. Where awards are retained after termination, vesting is still subject to malus and clawback provisions, as per normal operation of the awards.

Approach to recruitment and promotions

The remuneration package for a new Executive Director would be set in accordance with the terms of the Group approved Policy.

On recruitment, the salary may (but need not necessarily) be set lower than the relevant current Executive Director, with phased increases (which may be above the average increase for the wider employee population) as the new Executive Director gains experience. The salary would in all cases be set to reflect the individual's experience and skills and the scope of the role.

Bonus and PSP awards may each be up to 135% of salary for new Executive Directors, (as set out in the Policy table) to allow the Committee the flexibility to increase the weighting for variable pay should it be considered appropriate. The Committee will, in agreeing such a package consider the incoming Executive Director's skills and experience, the departing Executive Director's remuneration package, the remuneration package at their former employer and relevant market practice for similar roles.

The Group may take into account and compensate for remuneration foregone upon leaving a previous employer using cash awards, the Group's share plans, or awards under Listing Rule 9.4.2. This would include taking into account: the quantum foregone; the extent to which performance conditions apply; the form of award; and the time left to vesting. These would be structured in line with any regulatory requirements (such as the PRA Rulebook).

For all appointments, the Committee may agree that the Group will meet certain appropriate relocation costs.

For an internal appointment, including the situation where an Executive Director is appointed following corporate activity, any variable pay earnt whilst in their prior role would pay out according to its terms.

Should an individual be appointed to a role (Executive or Non-Executive) on an interim basis, the Company may provide additional remuneration, in line with the Policy, for the specific role for the duration the individual holds the interim role.

For the appointment of a new Chair or NED, the fee arrangement would be in accordance with the approved Policy in force at that time.

External appointments

Executive Directors may accept one directorship at another company with the consent of the Board, which will consider the time commitment required. The Executive Director would normally retain any fees from such an appointment.

Directors' Remuneration Report continued

Remuneration Policy continued

The Remuneration Policy for the Chair and Non-Executive Directors

Element	Purpose and link to strategy	Operation and performance conditions	Maximum opportunity
Fees	To attract and retain a high-calibre Chair and NEDs by offering a market competitive fee	The Chair and NEDs are entitled to an annual fee, with supplementary fees payable for additional responsibilities including for being the Chair or member of the Group Audit, Group Nomination and Governance, Group Remuneration and People, and Group Risk Committees and for acting as the SID Fees are reviewed periodically and there are no performance conditions The Chair and NEDs are entitled to reimbursement of travel and other reasonable expenses incurred in the performance of their duties	There is no prescribed maximum annual increase. The Committee is guided by the general increase in the non-executive market but on occasion may need to recognise, for example, change in responsibility and/or time commitments

Letters of appointment

Letters of appointment set out the duties and responsibilities of NEDs. The key terms are:

Provision	Policy
Period of appointment	Initial three-year term, subject to annual re-election by shareholders. On expiry of the initial term and subject to the needs of the Board, NEDs may be invited to serve a further three years. Beyond nine years, NEDs will be appointed at the discretion of the Group Nomination and Governance Committee
Notice periods	Three months on either side. Terminable with immediate effect and without compensation or payment in lieu of notice if the Chair or NEDs are not elected or re-elected to their position as a Director of the Company by shareholders
Payment in lieu of notice	The Company is entitled to make a payment in lieu of notice on termination

Letters of appointment are available for inspection at the Company's registered office. The effective dates of the current NEDs' appointments are shown in the table below.

Non-Executive Director	Date of appointment
Kal Atwal	7 February 2023
Noël Harwerth	4 October 2019 (appointed to the CCFS Board in June 2017)[1]
Sarah Hedger	1 February 2019[1]
Rajan Kapoor	4 October 2019 (appointed to the CCFS Board in September 2016)[1]
Simon Walker	4 January 2022
David Weymouth	1 September 2017[1]

1. These dates reflect the date that each NED joined OneSavings Bank plc (prior to the insertion of OSB GROUP PLC as the holding company and listed entity).

Approval

This report was approved by the Board of Directors (on the recommendation of the Group Remuneration and People Committee) and signed on its behalf by:



Sarah Hedger
Chair of the Group Remuneration and People Committee

14 March 2024